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Capitalism at War
“Capitalism means war.” Béla Kun, cited by Guérin (1938).
The nineteenth century witnessed the triumph of capitalism; the twentieth century
saw the bloodiest wars in history. Both war and society were transformed; what was
the link? In what ways did capitalism transform warfare? Was the capitalist system
responsible for spreading or facilitating war, or for the rising toll of war deaths?
To some, the connection is so obvious that it has required only illustration. Table
1, from a classic work by the Soviet demographer Boris Urlanis, is an example; the
pattern of interest is the rising trend in the final column.
Table 1. Capitalism, wars, and deaths in Europe over four centuries, from Urlanis
Period Years
Number
killed and
died in wars
(millions)
Duration
of period
(years)
Annual average
number killed
and died
(thousands)
I. Pre-monopoly
capitalism:
Formation of the
capitalist mode
of production 1600-1699 3.3 100 33
1700-1788 3.9 89 44
Industrial
capitalism 1789-1897 6.8 109 62
II. Imperialism 1898-1959
More
than 40 62 About 700
Source: This translates a table compiled by Urlanis (1960/1994, p. 405).
Modern scholarship would qualify this picture in three ways. First, it captures
only a narrow band in the overall spectrum of violence in society. This spectrum runs
all the way from ordinary homicide through the violence associated with organized
crime to social and political strife, civil war, and inter-state conflict. The data
generated for Table 1 omit a large part, and possibly the larger part of this spectrum.
Estimates of the incidence of deaths from violence of all types in society over the
last ten thousand years are suggestive of a great decline that continues to the
present day (Gat 2006; Pinker 2011).
Second, if we limit our focus to conflicts among states, the two World Wars of
the first half of the twentieth century continue to be recognized as the greatest wars
in history. The second half of the century was much more peaceful, however, on a
variety of measures (Kristian Gleditsch 2004; Nils Gleditsch 2008; Hewitt 2008;
Pinker 2011; Goldstein 2011. The annual number of wars involving fatalities and the
2number of military fatalities in each year declined. These downward trends
continued through the turn of the century, despite conflicts associated with the
breakup of the Soviet and Yugoslav states in the early 1990s.
Third, not all indicators have been pointing in the same benign direction. While
the intensity of conflict appears to be in decline, the global propensity for inter-state
confrontation appears to be rising (Harrison and Wolf 2011). What this means is
that, while the probability that any pair of countries in the world would find
themselves in conflict in a given year fell slowly (Martin, Mayer and Thoenig 2008),
there was a great increase in the number of countries. More countries have meant
more state actors claiming sovereignty over the use of force in global society, and
more borders over which to quarrel. While the quality of disputes may have been
changing for the better, their quantity has been changing for the worse.
What does all this have to do with capitalism? The question is more complicated
than would appear at first sight. First, it raises important issues of identification:
what is “capitalism” and what can it mean to say, as some have claimed, that
“capitalism means war”? I will consider these questions next. After that, I will go one
step at a time. In the second part of the chapter I will ask whether capitalism has
affected our choices over war and peace by changing opportunity costs. Specifically,
have we had more wars, not because we wanted them, but because we could? In
the third part I will ask whether the structure of the capitalist economy has led the
owners of capital to show some systematic preference for war by comparison with
the elites of other systems. The fourth part concludes.1. Capitalism, Anti-Capitalism, and War
Ricardo (1817) used the word “capitalist” to distinguish the owners of capital from
the owners of land and labour. But the mere existence of capitalists falls short of
implying “capitalism,” an entire economic and social system with private capital
ownership at its foundation. In fact, the identity of capitalism was created by its
critics, Proudhon (1861) and Marx (1867). Marx, before anyone else, argued that
capitalism’s defining features allow us logically to infer distinct and general
attributes of capitalism (such as alienation) and propensities (such as the declining
rate of profit). To inquire in this sense into whether “capitalism” as such has a
propensity for anything, let alone something as emotive as war, is to enter a debate
on conceptual territory chosen by the enemies of capitalism.
Second, the histories of capitalism and warfare are certainly intertwined, but not
uniquely. War is as old as history; capitalism is not. All societies that have given rise
to organized government have engaged in warfare (Tilly 1975). The slave and serf
societies and city states of the ancient, classical, and medieval eras made war freely.
Turning to modern times, the socialist states of the twentieth century were born in
wartime, prepared for war, and did not shrink from the use of military power to
achieve their goals. Thinking comparatively, it will not be easy to identify any causal
connection between capitalism and war. At most, we will look for some adaptation
or propensity for war under capitalism, relative to other systems.
3Third, if there is a story here, who are the actors? Capitalism is an economic
structure; war is a political act. War can hardly be explained by structure alone, for
there is no war without agency, calculation, and decision. Given this, our search
must be for aspects of capitalism that may have created incentives and propensities
for the political actors to choose war with greater frequency, and made them more
willing to impose the increasing costs of war on society, than under alternative
conditions, real or counterfactual.
To be clear at the outset, I’ll follow the definition of capitalism set out by Larry
Neal (2011): “1) private property rights, 2) enforceable contracts, 3) markets with
prices responsive to supply and demand, 4) supportive governments.” Here,
“supportive” means supportive of the first three features, not supportive of wealthy
individuals, rich corporations, or other special interest groups.
If that is capitalism, it implies the existence of both pre-capitalism and anti-
capitalism. First, in nearly all countries before the seventeenth century there was
private property and markets existed, but much production was not marketed and
many prices were not free. Contracts were insecure. Rulers tended to be more
concerned with their own prerogatives than with accepting and upholding the rule
of law. Whatever you call it, it was not capitalism.
In the twentieth century we have anti-capitalism. Most obvious was
communism: where they could, the communists abolished private business
ownership, suppressed markets, and imposed dictatorship over the law.
Communism, also, was clearly not capitalism.
More contested is the case of fascism. Was fascism somewhere within the
spectrum of capitalisms, or outside it and antithetical to it? “Fascism is war,” wrote
Dimitrov (1936/1972, p. 176). If fascism is capitalism, and fascism means war, then
capitalism means war. So this is important to get right. Under fascist rule there was
dictatorship. The courts upheld the interests of the state, not the rights of the citizen
or the rule of law. Private property existed, but property rights were maintained if
the government allowed, not otherwise (Overy 1994). Often the government did
wish it, viewing contracts with capitalist proprietors as creating the right incentives
for efficient procurement (Buchheim 2006). Whether this was a deep conviction or
an instrumental motivation is debated; Hitler himself declared on one occasion that
family property was a productive institution but joint-stock shareholders were
parasites whom the state should expropriate (Trevor Roper 2000, pp. 362-363).
There were markets, but many prices were regulated and the government often
rationed goods to producers and consumers (Milward 1965).
Was fascism closer to socialism or communism than to capitalism? In Italy, the
fascist Mussolini came out of the Socialist Party. In Germany, Hitler called his
followers National Socialists. When they railed against capitalism, brawled in the
streets, and promoted mass mobilization, a politicized and militarized economy, and
dictatorial rule, the fascists did not look very different from the communists, who
struggled to differentiate themselves. Left socialists and communists emphasized
fascism as an extreme variant of capitalism to cover the resulting embarrassment.
The canonical example is Stalin’s infamous Short Course (CPSU 1941, pp. 301-2),
according to which fascism was “the dictatorship of the most reactionary, most
4chauvinistic, most imperialistic capitalist elements,” taking the name of national
socialism only “in order to hoodwink the people.”
The communists portrayed fascism as pro-capitalism in disguise. I do not find
this convincing. The Nazis did not try to disguise anything else; they were not
ashamed to advocate racial hatred and war, for example. Compared with these,
being in favour of capitalism would seem a small thing; why would they have wished
to hide it? Perhaps we should take them at their word: if this was still capitalism, it
was captured by an anti-capitalist political agency. Fascism made property, prices,
and contracts conditional on the will of the government. This does not mean that
fascism and communism were the same. But the superiority of the state over private
interests was something they held in common.
As for capitalism and war there is already a large literature, so we do not start
from a blank page. I will mention some highlights as we proceed. I will organize the
discussion in the following order. Has the existence of capitalism, in some morally
neutral and quite general sense, promoted the capacity for war in global society?
Then, does the structure of the capitalist economy exhibit some systematic
preference for war in comparison to other systems?2. The Capacity for War
Has capitalism promoted the capacity for war? Before 1914, many observers of the
rise of international business would have answered this question decisively in the
negative. Writers like Norman Angell (1911) and Jean de Bloch (1914) believed that
modern capitalism had driven up the opportunity cost of war to a point where the
industrial and commercial powers would no longer fight major wars. They were both
right and wrong. In the twentieth century the costs of war were unprecedented. As
it turned out, however, the costs of not being prepared for war and of not fighting
had risen even more rapidly. Moreover, the heavy costs of warfare proved to be
unexpectedly sustainable; it turned out that major industrial economies could bear
them for years on end without collapsing. How did this come about?
Military innovation
The relative price of destruction has been falling for centuries. The headlines we pay
most attention to may be the big ticket items like interceptor aircraft and warships;
when we do that, we may forget that their destructive power is rising more rapidly
than the price. Today, you can destroy a city in a flash, and the means will fit in a
suitcase. Two generations ago you could do it in a night, but it required not less than
a thousand bombers. A few generations before that, to ruin a city took an army
weeks or months of unceasing effort, with uncertain results.
It is almost too obvious to say that capitalist industry has hugely affected this
process, primarily through mechanization. Capitalism mechanized the weaponry, the
production and projection of weapons, and the transportation of armies. This is so
obvious that it may seem impossible to overstate. Yet, it can be overstated, for
several reasons.
First, the long term decline in the real price of weaponry did not start with
industrial capitalism; the industrial revolution prolonged and speeded up a tendency
5that was already in place. Philip Hoffman (2011) has shown that the real price of
weapons was falling in the late Middle Ages, long before capitalism. It fell faster in
Europe than elsewhere. Its driver was the battlefield rivalry of princes, not the
market competition of capitalist firms. Europe’s lasting comparative advantage in
what Hoffman calls the “gunpowder technology” was conditioned on its political
divisions, its lack of natural frontiers, and princely competition. Capitalism continued
this trend, and was well suited to accelerate it. But capitalism did not start it.
Second, the mechanism of improvement was largely the competition of private
producers, but government provided the market, and in the few countries that
maintained large defence industries competition was (and remains) highly
imperfect. Military-technical innovation is subsidized. Pre-contract lobbying and
collusion, among firms and between buyer and seller, and post-contract
renegotiation are normal (Rogerson 1994). These standard features of capitalist
defence markets were largely replicated under both national socialism and
communism (Milward 1965; Overy 1994; Buchheim 2006; Markevich and Harrison
2006; Harrison and Markevich 2008a,b).
If we limit ourselves to the qualitative improvement of military technologies in
the twentieth century competition between different social systems, it would
appear that the capitalist economies had the edge. But it is hard to tell whether this
is because capitalism was better than other systems at this specifically, or whether
capitalist economies were just richer and so better than other economies at
everything, including military-technical innovation.
Fiscal capacity
A more original contribution of capitalism was enormously to enhance the fiscal
capacity of the state. This innovation arose from the commercial revolution of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Spreading from the Dutch Republic to
England, this revolution separated the economy from politics, and public finance
from the money of the king; it subjected property rights, contracts, and exchange to
the rule of law, even when one of the contracting parties was the king. The result
was a dramatic increase in the willingness of the wealthy to pay taxes and in the
ability of the government to borrow (Hoffman and Rosenthal 1997; Bonney 1999;
Ferguson 2001; O’Brien 2005, 2011).
Fiscal revolution gave unprecedented power to governments to extract
resources from the economy. This power grew to the point where, during World
War I, it could put the viability of the “home front” at risk. For the first time, a
relatively developed economy such as Germany’s might exhaust itself because the
government spent too much on the war (Feldman 1966).
Fiscal revolution was delayed, in contrast, in the agrarian states in central and
southeastern Europe (Karaman and Pamuk 2010). In World War I, a clear gap
emerged between the French and German economies, with half of GDP allocated to
the war or more, and Austria-Hungary and Turkey, which struggled and failed to
reach one third (Broadberry and Harrison 2005). The inability of the Habsburg and
Ottoman rulers to raise and centralize revenues and spend them on the war was an
important factor in their eventual defeat (Schulze 2005; Pamuk 2005).
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twentieth century, proved temporary. The 1930s saw the rise of states intent on
promoting industrial power where property was less private, contracts less
enforceable, prices less responsive to supply and demand, and governments more
intent on supporting their own geopolitical agendas than the rule of law and free
enterprise. In short, these states were less “capitalist”; we know them as varieties of
fascism and communism. During World War II, Britain and America could once again
drive their fiscal ratios to half of national income or more, but Germany, Japan, and
the Soviet Union could go higher, to 60 or even 70 percent (Harrison 1998), at least
for short periods. This was a second fiscal revolution.
If the first fiscal revolution was based on transparency and the rule of law, the
second revolution was based on modern nationalism and modern repression. A
nationalist police state proved an effective substitute for transparent legal
regulation. Nationalism and repression gave Hitler, Stalin, and the Japanese military
a coercive power to mobilize society and centralize resources not only far beyond
the traditional bureaucracies that they succeeded, but even greater than liberal
capitalism. Fascism and ultra-nationalism did not survive 1945, but communism did.
The capacity to pour resources into a privileged and prioritized defence sector was
the basis of the Soviet Union’s postwar superpower status, achieved despite
mediocre economic performance (Harrison 2001, p. 81).
There was another way in which capitalism promoted fiscal mobilization. This
was by transforming agriculture. Agriculture was an important source of rents for
traditional agrarian bureaucracies, but collecting and centralizing direct revenues
from small scale subsistence farmers generally involved high transaction costs and
payoff to intermediary landlords and tax farmers. Urbanization and the spread of
urban-rural exchange created the possibility of taxing farmers indirectly by turning
the terms of trade against them. In fact, such a shift in the terms of trade was an
inevitable result of war mobilization, which diverted the production capacities of
industry to the supply of war and curtailed supplies to the countryside. Faced with
this, pre-capitalist or proto-capitalist farmers still had an “inside” option: to retreat
into autarky and feed themselves alone, leaving the food needs of the industrial
workers and soldiers unmet (Offer 1989; Broadberry and Harrison 2005). In much of
central and eastern Europe in two world wars, a large part of the domestic economy
proved able to withhold resources from the grabbing hand of the state. There were
local famines and spreading general hunger.
In Britain and America, capitalist farms, fully integrated into the economy as a
whole, no longer had the inside option. They proved to be as responsive as any
other business to wartime incentives and controls. Agricultural production was
quickly expanded (in the British case) and restructured to increase the calorie yield
per hectare. There was less butter and meat, and more cereals and potatoes;
nobody starved.
The dictators, governing countries with large peasant populations, arrived at
contrasting solutions. The Axis powers aimed to avoid having to squeeze their own
farmers by imposing starvation on the foreign territories they occupied. Starvation
followed, but with disappointing results for domestic food availability (Collingham
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designed to rule out the Soviet peasant’s inside option (Harrison 2011). To enforce
collectivization required violence of the level of a civil war, leading to millions of
famine deaths. The result was an agricultural system that was less productive but
more amenable to government control. It did not prevent further famine deaths in
wartime, but it did ensure that the Soviet wartime economy did not disintegrate.
In short, capitalism proved to have advantages in mobilizing resources for
warfare. These advantages arose, paradoxically, from the ability of the government
to bind itself by the laws of the state, just like a private person. The advantage was
temporary, and was lost when modern dictators learned to break traditional
constraints on authoritarian rule.
Managing war risks
Angell (1911) and his followers, such as Cordell Hull (1948), expected globalized
capitalism to inaugurate lasting peace because of the interdependence it enforced
upon trading states. International trade, they believed, created complementarities
in the world economy, powerful enough to turn national rivals into international
partners in a global network of stable, durable supply chains. In the language of risk
management, they would have said that war threatened modern economies with
universal breakdown; because this was an aggregate risk, there would be nowhere
to hedge it or lay it off. Risk-averse governments would therefore back away.
The real historical relationship between war and trade is different. Since the
eighteenth century, the economies that were most open to multilateral trade
proved also to be strategically more secure. Far from being a source of war risk, long
distance trade turned out to be an instrument for managing it. In two world wars,
the alliances that were better placed to maintain external economic integration also
better managed food resources across countries and fighting power across the
theatres of combat (Harrison 1998; Broadberry and Harrison 2005). The countries
that had resisted globalization in peacetime suffered local famines and generalized
hunger in wartime (Collingham 2010). In short, the “commercial” capacity for war
deserves to be ranked alongside the technological and fiscal capacities that made
modern mass warfare possible (Harrison and Wolf 2011).1
1 The strategic advantage that goes along with being able to trade across the
world is still not well understood in public policy debate. This is shown by the
discussions that our societies continue to have about “food security” and “energy
security.” Despite two centuries of evidence to the contrary, many people continue
to identify security with self-sufficiency. In a bipartisan spirit, here are two recent
examples. On December 19, 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush signed into law
the Energy Independence and Security Act, which aims to “move the United States
toward greater energy independence and security.” And, in a widely cited speech on
United Nations World Food Day, October 16, 2008, former U.S. President Bill Clinton
said: “Food is not a commodity like others. We should go back to a policy of
maximum food self-sufficiency. It is crazy for us to think we can develop countries
around the world without increasing their ability to feed themselves.” In fact autarky
and security are unrelated or even inversely related. It was long distance trade
8Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008) show how globalization has helped to
manage war risks. Using data from 1970 to 2000, they show that trade has a double
effect on the propensity for war. Consider any pair of countries. The more a country
traded with its pair, they show, the more likely were the two to remain at peace. But
as trade increased with third countries, the less likely was peace to persist. Bilateral
trade reduced the frequency of bilateral war; multilateral trade increased it.
At the root of the historical process was falling trade costs (Jacks, Meissner, and
Novy 2008). Suppose the leaders of a country have some reason to fight their
neighbour. Under high trade costs, the adversary is the only trading partner. There is
no substitute for the food and fuel previously imported, so war leads to autarky. The
peacetime supply chain is broken; the home prices of food and fuel must rise. The
duration of autarky is uncertain, since it depends on how quickly the war can be
concluded, which is a matter of chance. As a result, the risk of persistent trade
disruption and economic losses is high. When trade costs are low, in contrast, the
home country can lay off its war risks in the rest of the world; for example, it can
easily substitute away from the neighbour for the source of its imports. The broken
supply chain can be replaced with others. Thus, low trade costs enable the home
country to fight its neighbour while continuing to trade with the rest of the world.
Falling trade costs, the economic aspect of globalization, reduced the market
risks that countries faced as they contemplated war. Did capitalism do this? The
modern era is not the first in which trade costs have fallen. Long before modern
capitalism, Mediterranean trade was repeatedly transformed by innovations in
agriculture, shipping, and contractual institutions. The greatest revolution in global
trade, the opening up of the Atlantic economy, came on the eve of the capitalist era
(Açemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005). The most that may be said is that the rise
of capitalism continued a process that was already under way.
War as a free lunch
There is a persistent view that, without wars, capitalism would fall into depression
(e.g. Steindl 1952; Baran and Sweezy 1966). The philosophy of “military
Keynesianism” maintains that capitalist economies tend to suffer from a deficiency
of demand, and will stagnate without frequent injections of demand into the circular
flow of income. The deficiency can be made up by debt-financed military spending
combined with the Keynesian multiplier. If so, it does not follow that “capitalism
means war.” Rather, it implies one more way in which capitalism has reduced the
costs of war. In this case, it is suggested that capitalism can supply war free of
charge. If the weapons and armies were not bought up by the government, the
resources they represent would be unused; this would make war a free lunch. The
lunch will then be eaten, not because we are hungry, but because it is free.
Three historical examples are frequently cited. One is the German recovery from
the Great Depression under Hitler’s four-year plans; there, unemployment fell from
29.9 percent of the working population in 1932 to 1.9 percent in 1938. Joan
based on specialization that made the major capitalist economies rich, and trade
also made them secure – even in wartime.
9Robinson (1972, p. 8) started the legend of a Keynesian recovery by proposing that
“Hitler had already found how to cure unemployment before Keynes had finished
explaining why it occurred.” Another was the vast war boom that followed U.S.
entry into World War II; U.S. unemployment fall from 9.5 percent in 1940 (or 14.6
percent, if we include those on “emergency government employment”) to 1.2
percent in 1944. So strong was the connection that afterwards Paul Samuelson (in
1948, cited by Rockoff 2005) likened fiscal policy to the atomic bomb: “Too powerful
a weapon to let men and government play with.” And third is the generally higher
level of NATO countries’ military spending at the height of the Cold War compared
with previous norms, illustrated in Table 2.
Table 2. Military spending, 1870 to 1979, percent of GDP, in four countries
Country 1870 to 1913 1920 to 1938 1960 1970 1979
USA 0.7 1.2 8.9 7.9 5.2
UK 2.6 3.0 6.5 4.8 4.8
France 3.7 4.3 6.3 4.2 3.9
Germany/West Germany 2.6 3.3 4.0 3.5 3.2
Sources: 1870-1913 and 1920-1938 from Eloranta and Harrison (2010); later years
from Murdoch and Sandler (1984).
More detailed investigations of these episodes have given little support to the
Keynesian interpretation. In the German case, recovery had already begun when
Hitler took power. Reconstructing fiscal aggregates from the German archives,
Ritschl (2000) shows that full-employment budget deficits were modest until 1936,
and too small to account for recovery. Multiplier effects cannot be identified with
any confidence because (as modern macro would predict) current household
income was one of the least important determinants of consumer spending. Rather
than exploiting the multiplier to promote recovery, National Socialist policies
repressed consumption to make room for public investment and rearmament.
As for the U.S. experience, Robert Higgs (1992) pointed out that between 1940
and 1944 the government pulled the equivalent of 22 percent of the prewar working
population into the armed forces. “No one needs a macroeconomic model,” he
wrote, “to understand this event.” What happened after the war is of greater
interest. Between 1944 and 1947 U.S. military outlays fell by 37 percent of GDP, yet
in the same period 3.9 million civilian jobs were created (Rockoff 1998, pp. 83, 101).
In the same way, the postwar demilitarization of western Germany did not lead to
stagnation but was the prelude to the Wirtschaftswunder.
More generally, the hypothesis that postwar capitalism has stabilized itself by
means of military spending finds no support in the data. In the 1960s, military
spending shares across NATO countries were strongly correlated with GDP, and not
at all with GDP per head (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Smith 1977); in other words,
defence allocations reflected economies of scale and security spillovers, not
underconsumption. During the “great moderation” that began in the 1970s, western
economic growth became smoother, and unemployment fell, but this owed nothing
to military spending, national shares of which continued to decline (Smith 2009, pp.
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99-102) along the trend already visible in Table 2. In the recent global recession,
conservative voices (e.g. Feldstein 2008) called for military spending to be used
countercyclically, but there is no evidence that they were heard.
As for theory, modern macroeconomics tends to the conclusion that, in a
competitive capitalist economy, a stable inflation target (for the central bank) and
stable tax-and-spending rules (for the fiscal authority) will assure full employment in
the medium term. Whatever the implications of the recent recession, it is hard to
find anyone who seriously thinks capitalism cannot recover without a boost from
military spending. There is nothing military spending can do for capitalism that
cannot be done more efficiently by tax cuts or monetary easing.3. Preferences for War
Up to this point, we have considered whether capitalism lowered the costs of going
to war. Preferences for war have been left outside the story so far. Even if
preferences were strongly biased towards peace, and were stable, and had not
changed, lower opportunity costs could be expected to make war more frequent.
Beyond this point lie more radical questions. Motivating them is the possibility that
capitalism – or capitalists –might have derived specific benefits from war, such that
war might have become the systematically preferred means of resolving internal or
external problems.
Lobbies for war
On the face of it, capitalism and war would seem to be a surprising association. It
was of the era before capitalism that Charles Tilly (1975, p. 42) wrote, “War made
the state and states made war.” As late as the eighteenth century, Prussia was “not
a country with an army, but an army with a country” (Friedrich von Schrötter, cited
by Blackbourn 2003, p. 17). The rise of capitalism separated the economy from
politics and decentralized economic power. The accumulation of industrial, financial,
human, and social capital reduced the importance of natural resources and the
territory on which they could be found. And modern commerce gave the state so
much more to think about than soldiers and guns. These are all visible reasons why
one might expect capitalist societies to have lost the taste for war.
The idea that capitalism not only means war but wants war persists on two main
foundations. One is a simple post-hoc-propter-hoc argument: first, global capitalism,
then global war. The other is a dark view of the world that disputes what is visible on
the surface: that capitalism decentralizes economic decisions, and that democratic
government truly governs. Instead, it views the separation of business from the
state as a façade behind which lobbying and conspiracies go on invisibly, to the
detriment of both property rights and democracy.
Writing during the Great War, Lenin (1916) thought he observed the first
transnational companies competing with each other for shares of the world market,
while colluding to drive governments to re-divide the world’s colonial spheres to
private advantage. Between the wars, radical commentators in both Germany and
America argued that national business elites had promoted war as a source of war
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profits (for the accusations against the “merchants of death,” see Engelbrecht and
Hanighen 1934). In the postwar period U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1961)
warned again of the political danger arising from a large peacetime “military-
industrial complex.” More recent variants of this tradition include the “oil wars” of
Pelletière (2004) and Naomi Klein’s (2007) “disaster capitalism.”
We will go step by step through this complex topic. Does the corporate sector
expect to profit from war? Does it actually profit from war? Do corporate owners
value connections to power? Do they use these connections to lobby for war
contracts? Do such activities have analogues under anti-capitalist and non-capitalist
regimes?
To start with profit expectations, if war is a capitalist conspiracy, it turns out that
the capitalists were generally not too happy when the conspiracy worked. As Niall
Ferguson and others have documented, on the outbreak of World War I, European
bond prices fell and unemployment rose in London, Paris, and Berlin (Lawrence,
Dean, and Robert 1992; Ferguson 1998, pp. 186-197). The panic on Wall Street was
so great that the New York Stock Exchange was closed for the rest of the year.
Figure 1. Daily Closing Values of the Dow Jones Industrial Average
Source: http://measuringworth.com/datasets/DJA/, accessed on June 8, 2011.
Key:
July 25, 1914: Russia mobilizes against Germany.
March 1, 1917: The Zimmermann telegram published.
September 1, 1939: Germany invades Poland.
December 7, 1941: Japan attacks Pearl Harbor.
June 25, 1950: North Korea invades South Korea.
August 7, 1964: Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
August 2, 1990: Iraq invades Kuwait.
September 11, 2001: Al-Qaeda attacks American cities.
More generally, think of stock prices as embodying the probabilistic profit
expectations of the owners of capital. There is no evidence that stockholders see the
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realization of war probabilities in a positive light. Figure 1 shows closing values of
the Dow Jones Industrial Average in New York for the ten working days before and
after eight twentieth-century crises (the value on the day itself is omitted). Only two
events saw stock prices climb; in five they fell, and two cases the stock market was
closed (for more than four months after the outbreak of World War I in Europe, and
for four days after 9/11). The median change in stock prices over the eight crises was
a 5.2 percent decline.
After realized war come realized war profits. Have wars provided private
business with direct benefits? The Great War saw widespread discontent in both
Britain and Germany over industrial war profits and war profiteers (Carsten 1982). In
most countries, major wars reduced incomes and weakened the family-based or
social safety net, so that poor and vulnerable people suffered harm. It was a short
step from this to the idea that the rich had exploited the opportunity of war in order
to tilt the distribution of income in their own favour (and a short further step to the
proposal that the rich had promoted the war with this in mind).
With regard to World War I, Hardach (1977, pp. 106-107) and Kocka (1984)
made the initial case that war profits destabilized the distribution of income among
the German social classes. Hardach concluded: “These findings point, not so much to
the harnessing of big business to the machine of state, as to the reverse.” The
original claims have been re-examined by Baten and Schulz (2005) and Ritschl
(2005). Baten and Schulz find that the appearance of rising inequality is explained by
two errors, a failure to account for inflation in measuring profits, and a selection bias
in the profits reported. A wider sample of big businesses shows the real profits of
German large-scale industry declining pari passu with returns to labour, so that the
labour share in national income, after initial improvement, was more or less the
same in 1917 as it had been in 1913. Ritschl reached similar results independently by
comparing real wage and real output data.
The claim that corporate owners were able to exploit war conditions to increase
their profit incomes acquired its hold on the popular imagination in association with
the image of an organized, secretive, military-industrial lobby at work behind the
scenes. Therefore, we turn to consider corporate political action, on which there is a
large literature. Adam Smith (1776) remarked on the propensity of “people of the
same trade” to meet and conspire against the public. In fact, do corporate owners
lobby politicians and make self-interested political donations? Yes, all the time
(Hillman et al. 2004). Do they value these connections? Again, yes. In countries that
are relatively corrupt, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, connections to the ruling
party add market value to the firm (Fisman 2000, Johnson and Mitton 2003). In the
2000 U.S. presidential election, when Bush beat Gore, oil and tobacco firms gained
value and legal firms lost (Knight 2007). And German firms that were linked to the
Nazi Party before 1933 by donations or open support gained value when Hitler took
power (Ferguson and Voth 2008).
In capitalist societies there is lobbying behind the scenes. Who holds the
initiative in this relationship: the corporate owners looking for influence, or venal
politicians looking for money? Evidence on this can be found in historical narratives.
For example, it is well known that a meeting of German industrialists provided
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Hitler’s March 1933 election fund, but Hitler decided whom to invite to the meeting,
and he opened it with a blackmail threat to those present (Tooze 2006, pp. 99-106).
In other words, his corporate sponsors took the opportunity to support him, but
Hitler created the opportunity and conditioned the incentives to participate.
Two world wars left German capitalism with a bad press, much of it deserved.
Even so, the relationship between the industrialists and war aims was more complex
than is often assumed. The German industrialist Hugo Stinnes, for example, was a
militarist and imperialist in the Great War, but an economic liberal and a free-trader
before and after. The reason, Feldman (2000) argues, was circumstances: “The war
had created a new situation for Stinnes and, like strikes, which he would also just as
soon have seen disappear, one had to adjust to them and to their periodic
reappearance … this meant placing oneself in the best position for the next
occurrence, and that was the goal, exaggerated and uncontrolled as it was, of
Stinnes’s war-aims policies.”
Studies of German industry and industrialists under the Third Reich point us in
the same direction. Many German business interests were “willing partners” in the
expansionist plans of the Third Reich (Tooze 2006, p. 134). Not all fell into line,
although most did. As Hitler’s plans unfolded, the compliant majority of business
leaders adapted easily to new perspectives, such as the idea that foreign forced
labour would become a permanent resource (Mommsen 2005, p. 182). In this way
they adapted to the growing inevitability and then the fact of war. But the plan for
war and the decision to execute it belonged to the political actors.
Gustav Krupp, for example, whose furnaces forged Hitler’s victories and whose
facilities exploited up to 100,000 slaves, was an early adherent to the Hitler regime.
But until 1933, Richard Overy (1994, pp. 119-143) has shown, he was a traditional
conservative. His chief aim was to keep his firm intact under family control, avoiding
the fate of Hugo Junkers whose opposition to Nazi plans led to a state takeover. Like
Hugo Stinnes, he accommodated to the realities that he could not alter.
Amongst German business, open opposition to Nazi plans was rare. This makes
Hermann Göring’s confrontation with the steel industrialists in 1937 all the more
revealing (Overy 1994, pp. 93-118). In the pursuit of autarky, Göring wished to
reorient the steel industry away from imported iron ores. In December 1936 he
demanded investments in facilities to exploit inferior domestic deposits. The Ruhr
industrialists resisted for a variety of reasons including the fear that, once they had
committed the investments, the National Socialist state would hold them up for
lower steel prices. While their united front was quickly broken, the outcome was a
state-owned steel giant, the Reichswerke Hermann Göring, which later became the
major conglomerate vehicle for German investments in occupied Europe (Overy
1994, pp. 144-174).
The common feature of these stories is the “primacy of politics” (Mason 1968).
Germany’s political leaders held the initiative. The behaviour of German firms was
reactive, defensive, and opportunistic. It is not a pretty picture, but it does not show
a capitalist lobby for war. Overy (1994, p. 94) concludes the Krupp story: “Nazi
political hegemony in the end prevented German capitalists from acting as
capitalists.” From this we learn not about how big business changed government,
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but how big government diverted business from competitive profit seeking to rent
seeking and dependence on government contracts and subsidies.
Interwar evidence on the influence of military-industrial lobbies in other
countries is thin. Wilson and Eloranta (2009) have carefully examined the military
procurement practices of four interwar democracies (the UK, USA, Sweden, and
Finland). They show that democratic institutions created effective barriers to
profiteering from rearmament. Edgerton’s (2006) revisionist history finds the first
exemplar of a modern military-industrial complex in interwar Britain’s “warfare
state,” but this one was led by efficient technocrats, not greedy capitalists or venal
politicians. Robert Higgs (1993) has shown that, on the eve of World War II,
American business people were distrustful of the Roosevelt administration,
reluctant to undertake war investments, suspicious of the government interference
that would follow if they did, and fearful that they would not be allowed to make
money on them.
If capitalist money has observable influence on politics anywhere, it must surely
be in the postwar United States. Robert Higgs has modelled the strategic interaction
among American voters, defence producers, and politicians in the Cold War (Higgs
and Kilduff 1993; Higgs 1994). Defence firms provided jobs for voters and campaign
funding for politicians seeking election. They were rewarded by a swollen military
budget that overprovided both national defence and private profit. The losers were
the taxpayers and the armed forces, whose budget was diverted to purchasing lines
of equipment that they did not want and could not use. The gains to defence
corporations and labour were concentrated and obvious; the efficiency losses were
diffuse and opaque, a recipe for status-quo bias (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991).
Even in this model, the carousel did not go round forever. In the end, voter
opinion could still bring it to a halt. Empirically, the balance of public sentiment on
whether defence spending should rise or fall was the single most important factor in
whether it did so. Successive generations of politicians worked to persuade the
public to accept the existence of security threats and shortfalls, but ultimately they
could not control voter sentiment. In an open society, two things limited public
support for the military and kept the defence budget in check: the tax increases
necessary to pay for defence resources, and the war casualties that followed from
using them in war. “Deaths and taxes,” Higgs argues, set the ultimate constraints on
the power of the military industrial complex.
How do such outcomes compare with those of non-capitalist arrangements? The
Soviet defence market differed from the American defence market most obviously in
the lack of transparency and public accountability. The postwar Soviet defence
sector took a consistently larger share of national resources than the American one
(Firth and Noren 1998). If American corporations lobbied for development funding,
so too could Soviet weapon designers; they did have to be more careful, knowing
Stalin’s capacity for suspicion (Harrison and Markevich 2008; Harrison 2008). The
Stalin-era state agencies responsible for the construction of defence plants were
prolific and willing users of forced labour (Harrison 1994; Simonov 2000). These
rough comparisons do not point to a moral deficit in capitalism. Rather, the
transparency and accountability of democratic political processes placed limits on
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the power of American military-industrial interests that did not exist under
communism.
David Holloway (1980, p. 158) once considered the proposition that “The Soviet
Union does not have a military-industrial complex, but is such a complex. This is too
sweeping a statement,” he commented, “but it does make the point that the history
of the Soviet Union is so bound up with military power that it seems wrong to speak
of a separate military-industrial complex acting within the state.”2 More recently
Kontorovich and Wein (2009) have asked: “What did the Soviet rulers maximise?”
Based on revealed preferences in resource allocation (“a high share of military
spending in GNP, a low share of consumption, and a high share of investment
directed primarily into heavy industry”) their answer is not “socialism” or economic
growth or even modernization but military power. In other words, no one needed to
lobby for it; it was a fundamental preference of the communist regime.3
To summarize: Are capitalist corporations interested in politics? Yes,
unquestionably. Do they lobby politicians and make self-interested political
donations? Yes, all the time. But do they lobby in favour of external confrontation or
conflict? Yes, if the opportunity appears to offer profit, but such opportunities are
infrequent, and an open society appears to place automatic limits on this. Do they
willingly exploit the spoils of conquest or enslavement? Yes, if the opportunity to do
so presents itself. Do they do these things systematically? There is no evidence of
that. In fact, the character of the state and the agency of politicians appear to be the
decisive factors. It seems to be communism, not capitalism, that has been more
conducive to a militarized economy and the accumulation of military power.
Diversionary wars
In the concept of diversionary wars, political leaders seek and exploit conflict with
external adversaries in order to rally domestic support. The idea is well established
in the literature, perhaps because the theoretical case is quite intuitive, and
narrative support is not hard to find. In fact, it may be too easy; as Jack Levy (1989)
2 In the same spirit the appointment of former defence minister Raúl Castro as
President of Cuba, where the armed forces control as much as 60 percent of the
economy (Gershman and Gutierrez 2009, p. 68), prompted Christopher Hitchens
(2006) to comment: “As was once said of Prussia, Cuba is not a country that has an
army but an army that has a country.”
3 While Stalin undeniably placed high priority on rearmament and military
power, it was still possible to overstate the case. According to Viktor Suvorov (1990),
Stalin’s rearmament was motivated by a plan for aggressive war (see also Raack
1995; Weeks 2002). On this view, in 1941 Stalin intended to use Hitler as his
“icebreaker” to the West; the Soviet plan was to exploit the opportunity presented
by Germany’s war with the Anglo-French alliance by launching an aggressive war to
occupy Europe; Hitler struck first to preempt this plan. This idea, if true, had far
reaching implications, because it would have transferred political (and moral)
responsibility for the opening of the Eastern front from Hitler to Stalin. For
refutations see Glantz (1998), Uldricks (1999), and Gorodetsky (1999).
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pointed out, few wars have not been attributed to political leaders’ desire to
improve domestic standing.
The idea of diversionary wars is directly relevant to a discussion of capitalism
only if it can be shown that capitalist polities are more likely to exploit foreign
adventures. One reason might be advanced from a Marxist perspective: perhaps
capitalist societies, being class-divided, are more likely to give rise to wars intended
to divert the workers from the cause of socialism. A longstanding interpretation of
the origins of World War I in domestic German politics conveys exactly this message
(Berghahn 1973).
This view does not sit well with the equally traditional idea that a class-divided
society is less able to go to war. The official Soviet histories of World War II used to
claim that, under capitalism, divided class interests made the working people
reluctant to fight for the nation. Because of this, the workers could be motivated to
take part only by “demagogy, deception, bribery, and force” (Grechko et al., eds
1982, vol. 12, p. 38; Pospelov et al., eds 1965, vol. 6, pp. 80-82).
Quantitative empirical work has lent little support to the idea (Levy 1989).
Exceptions include studies of the use of force by U.S. and British postwar
governments by Morgan and Bickers (1992) and Morgan and Anderson (1999). They
conclude that the use of force is more likely when government approval is high but
the government’s supporting coalition is suffering erosion. They also suggest that
force is unlikely to be used at high intensities under such circumstances (because
likely costs are high, eroding political support) or when domestic conflict is high
(because conflict would then be polarizing rather than consolidate support).
Another line of research suggests that new or incompletely established
democracies are particularly vulnerable to risky adventures in nation-building
(Mansfield and Snyder 2005). One inspiration for this view was the record of the
new democracies born out of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. More
recently, Georgia seems to have provided out-of-sample confirmation.
Suppose diversionary wars exist. Is capitalism somehow more internally
conflicted than other societies, and so disproportionately likely to externalize
conflict? As a comparator, the case of fascism seems straightforward. Fascism did
not produce diversionary wars because, for fascists, war was not a diversion; it was
the Schwerpunkt.
The more interesting case is that of communism. Communists do not seem to
have pursued diversionary wars. But the domestic legitimacy of Soviet rule visibly
relied on the image of an external enemy, and thrived on tension short of military
conflict. Soviet leaders used external tension to justify internal controls on
movement, culture, and expression, and the associated apparatus of secrecy,
censorship, and surveillance. When they tolerated trends towards détente in the
1970s, they subverted their own controls. An East German Stasi officer told his boss,
repeating it later to Garton Ash (1997, p. 159): “How can you expect me to prevent
[defections and revelations], when we’ve signed all these international agreements
for improved relations with the West, working conditions for journalists, freedom of
movement, respect for human rights?”
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If Soviet foreign policy was sometimes expansionist, it sought expansion only up
to the point where the desired level of tension was assured. Bolsheviks of the 1917
generation knew well that too much too much conflict abroad encouraged defeatist
and counter-revolutionary sentiments at home. Oleg Khlevniuk (1995, p. 174) noted:
“The complex relationship between war and revolution, which had almost seen the
tsarist regime toppled in 1905 and which finally brought its demise in 1917, was a
relationship of which Stalin was acutely aware. The lessons of history had to be
learnt lest history repeat itself.” Stalin did all he could to avoid war with Germany in
1941 (Gorodetsky 1999). Postwar Soviet leaders risked war by proxy, but avoided
direct conflict with the “main adversary.” Faced with unfavourable odds, they
tended to withdraw (from Cuba) or do nothing (in Poland) or accepted them with
great reluctance (in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan).
Diversionary tension must fall short of diversionary war. From this follows an
acceptance that capitalism, because of its tendency to give rise to democratic
structures and political competition, has been more open to diversionary wars than
other systems. But the empirical research and analysis that underpin this conclusion
also imply that such wars would generally be small scale and short lived, and the
circumstances that give rise to them would be exceptional or transient.
We should place this in the wider context of the “democratic peace.” As Levy
(1988) wrote: “Liberal or democratic states do not fight each other … This absence
of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law
in international relations.” Since all liberal democracies have also been capitalist on
any definition, it is a finding of deep relevance.
Capitalism’s Wars
America is the world’s preeminent capitalist power. According to a poll of more than
21,000 citizens of 21 countries in the second half of 2008, people tend on average to
evaluate U.S. foreign policy as inferior to that of their own country in the moral
dimension.4 While this survey does not disaggregate respondents by educational
status, many apparently knowledgeable people also seem to believe that, in the
modern world, most wars are caused by America; this impression is based on my
experience of presenting work on the frequency of wars to academic seminars in
several European countries.
According to the evidence, however, these beliefs are mistaken. We are all
aware of America’s wars, but they make only a small contribution to the total.
Counting all bilateral conflicts involving at least the show of force from 1870 to
2001, it turns out that the countries that originated them come from all parts of the
global income distribution (Harrison and Wolf 2011). Countries that are richer,
4 Specifically, 24 percent of respondents rated their own country’s foreign policy
as morally above average, and 21 percent rated it below average; the equivalent
ratings for U.S. foreign policy (with U.S. respondents excluded) were 20 percent
(above average) and 32 percent (below). “Most People Think Their Nation’s Foreign
Policy Is Morally No Better Than Average,” January 22, 2009, available from
http://www.WorldPublicOpinion.org (accessed October 18, 2011).
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measured by GDP per head, such as America do not tend to start more conflicts,
although there is a tendency for countries with larger GDPs to do so. Ranking
countries by the numbers of conflicts they initiated, the United States, with the
largest economy, comes only in second place; third place belongs to China. In first
place is Russia (the USSR between 1917 and 1991).
What do capitalist institutions contribute to the empirical patterns in the data?
Erik Gartzke (2007) has re-examined the hypothesis of the “democratic peace”
based on the possibility that, since capitalism and democracy are highly correlated
across countries and time, both democracy and peace might be products of the
same underlying cause, the spread of capitalist institutions.
It is a problem that our historical datasets have measured the spread of
capitalist property rights and economic freedoms over shorter time spans or on
fewer dimensions than political variables. For the period from 1950 to 1992, Gartzke
uses a measure of external financial and trade liberalization as most likely to signal
robust markets and a laissez faire policy. Countries that share this attribute of
capitalism above a certain level, he finds, do not fight each other, so there is
capitalist peace as well as democratic peace. Second, economic liberalization (of the
less liberalized of the pair of countries) is a more powerful predictor of bilateral
peace than democratization, controlling for the level of economic development and
measures of political affinity.4. Conclusion
I have compared capitalism and its historical alternatives. Has capitalism helped to
lower the costs of war? Yes, but not uniquely. The technological and trade costs of
war began to fall before the capitalist era; capitalism certainly continued this trend.
A distinctive contribution of capitalism came from the fiscal revolution of the
eighteenth century that opened the way for mass warfare in the twentieth. By the
twentieth century, however, the capitalist fiscal revolution had been all but
overtaken by the repressive mobilization capacities of fascism and communism. As
for the idea that capitalism reduced the costs of war by making it a Keynesian “free
lunch,” I reject it.
Does capitalism prefer war; that is, is war in the private interest of big business?
Yes – conditionally. History shows the government can put in place incentives that
align the private interests of big business with war, but this is a politically (not
economically) determined outcome. The interest of business in war is opportunity,
not strategy. There is no evidence that private business has had any greater interest
in war, conquest, exploitation, or enslavement than the private or bureaucratic
interests that have operated in other forms of society.
Are capitalist polities particularly liable to undertake foreign wars to divert
attention from conflicted issues at home? Yes, but only weakly: the circumstances
under which this happens are narrowly defined and the level of conflict is likely to be
low. Moreover, there is strong evidence that since 1945 capitalist democracies have
formed a “peace club” among themselves.
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The determinants of wars involve both structure and agency. Agency must have
a role, because wars are conceived, planned, declared, and waged by human actors.
On the historical evidence, capitalism has gone to war only when captured and
driven by a determined political enterprise. The fact remains that of all social
systems liberal capitalism seems to have least in common with war. This is because
of the primary emphasis that capitalism gives to private interests, decentralized
decisions, and personal freedoms. It is true that even liberal capitalism has allowed
the temporary subordination of the individual to the interests of the state in
wartime. In communist and fascist societies, in contrast, the supremacy of the state
over the individual was a permanent condition. Thus, communism and fascism seem
to have had more in common with states at war than with capitalism.
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